

Jackson's

August 26th 1911

Dear Bertie

Are there any proofs subsequent to sheet 29 which I have sent you by last night's post. If you received any earlier than Friday, please (to save time) send a P.C. to press to send me direct another copy. For the Chelsea P.O. must have delivered it in Lamb. Sq. But don't give general directions, since on Thursday I go to Cambridge.

I enclose my notes on your 'message'. My general view of your philosophy is that it is in the same state of transition as that in which Kant unfortunately wrote his Critique. What I recognize as distinctive yours, seems to me to be excellent. But where (in my ignorance) I guess that you are repeating received ideas, I cannot follow. You seem to me

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to lack self-confidence (or rather, time) to
systematize philosophy afresh, in accordance
with your own views. ?

From the point of view of the 'message' and
superficial alterations seem to me desirable and
a making apparent of the ragged ends and
difficulties. As a 'message', I cannot
praise too highly -

Yr affectly A.

A. N. W.

Chapter I

Here we start with perception of
a table. . . The question is asked,
~~first~~ What properties does the table really
have?

As to the 'shape' of the table'. Why assume
that our perception of space is two-dimensional?
Perhaps you don't. I can't get a decisive
instance just now. But the general
impression on my mind is that you do -
I may such an assumption is false psychology.

Real table (if it exist) = a Physical Object [p.6]

Senses immediately tell us, not the truth about
the object is it is apart from us, but only
the truth about certain sense-data which, as
far as we can see, depend on relations between
us and the object. - [p.10] also of p.5,6]

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Here in pages 5, 6 and 10 you seem by a
 slight of hand to take away the table which
 I (= the plain man) perceive. I see a
 'yellow table' and I feel a 'hard table'
 and I infer that I ~~do~~ feel what I see -
 you (rather obscurely) tell me that I feel see
 yellowness and feel hardness, and infer
 a real table. Such inferences are quite
 beyond plain people like myself - I
 perceive objects, and want to know ~~that~~
~~the~~ about the reality of the objects I perceive.
 You ignore this object (or rather smuggle it
~~away~~) and proceed to talk about perceptions
 of sensation of yellowness and hardness and of
 an inferred object which causes them -
 This criticism naturally extends ^{affects} to later chapters also.

Chapter II

Your confutation of the solipsist ~~argument~~ ^{solipsist} on p. 17 seems to me to be entirely fallacious.

First the reality of space seems assumed. e.g.

"... it ~~can never~~ cannot even have been in any place where I did not see it;" There is no such place.

Secondly - My talk of the cat 'being hungry' thereby suggesting that the cat really exists while I look at it.

As far as I can see all your objections are arrived at by making tacit presuppositions inconsistent with the position.

My I suggest that the strongest ground to take is to appeal to our judgments as to the worth of our affective ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~the~~ ^{the} moral intuitions. These judgments must be ~~not~~ ^{not} wrong, if the solipsist is right.

feel
nothing certain

Chapter III

p 23 "The real space is public, the apparent space is private to the percipient."

p 24 "These physical objects are in the space of science, which we may call 'physical' space."

p 29 "Thus it is quite gratuitous to suppose that physical objects have colours, and therefore there is no justification for making such a supposition. Exactly similar arguments apply to other sense-data."

p 36 "Our previous arguments concerning the colour did not prove it to be mental; they only proved that its existence depends upon the relation of our sense organs to the physical 'object' - in our case the table."

But the 'table' has been smuggled away by you long ago - you have only left us

perceptions of colour etc. and an imagined
physical world which ~~causes~~ causes it.

Note that ~~the~~ ^{physical objects as} particular causes of our
perceptions suffer from the usual defect
of all particular causation. If you
trace it down far enough, all our perceptions
(on the scientific hypothesis) come from the
relation of ourselves to the whole ^{physical} ~~universe~~.

Was not Berkeley talking of the 'table' which
the plain man perceives?

p 28 Surely you are wrong in making Kant
identify the "physical object" with
the "thing-in-itself". All the notions associated
with time, space, number, causation apply
to ~~you~~ the physical object, ~~none~~ of them

to Kant's thing-in-itself -

I venture to summarize Kant thus -

I (Ego) am in relation to a reality other than myself. This relation as known to me is to be found in my sensations, where alone are marks of an activity other than my own. I, by a self-activity which can be analysed into an application of the pure forms of time and space and a synthetic ^{etc. etc.} unity of apperception [to me mysterious (A.W.)], would these relations ~~as they know~~ (expressed in sensation) its perceptions of objects, the phenomenal objects. All ^{my} ordinary ideas apply to these phenomenal objects & necessarily, because they are mere expressions

of an analysis of the process of formation
 by me. The molecules of science are
 conceived phenomenal objects which
 have merely the ~~phen~~ properties of being
 in time and place, but have a ~~superior~~
 permanence of existence and of mutual
 relations ^{superior that of} to the perceived phenomenal
 objects, and thus satisfy ~~the~~
 the intellectual demand that all change
 is a change of something itself permanent.
 [He lays down this principle somewhere, but
 I have not read him for more than 20 years, so
 cannot quote]. ~~As~~ We can I can say
 nothing of the real - other - than - myself which
 is indicated by my sensations - I infer its
 existence from the lack of necessity in the

occurrence of sensations, so that sensations do not express myself —

Now if this is anything like Kant, you do not touch him - 1st you muddle the ~~the~~ physical object (= scientific molecule?) in 'public space' with his thing-in-itself - 2nd you have smuggled away and ignored the phenomenal object with which he starts. Thus the whole point of the 'phenomenon' as mentioned by you on p 28 is lost - 3rd your 'main objection' on p 29 is that our nature is a part of the ~~the~~ 'existing world'. What do you mean by 'existing world'? Apparently something in time, for 'tomorrow' applies to it. Kant would certainly leave

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denied this. This would be the
 'phenomenal ego' - The transcendental
 ego' is not in this - rather converse.
 What Kant has to face ^{according to your argument} is that he
 has not proved that the ~~phenomenal objects~~
 certainties of today are those of tomorrow.
 This is exactly what he has been trying to
 prove - namely that only those things are
 certainties which are necessary to ^[i.e., involved in] the
~~essence~~ ~~phen~~ ~~phen~~ perception of a
 phenomenal object ~~itself~~ - His argument is
 'apart from them, no object' - Your
 argument is 'Objects may tomorrow
 have different properties'. His reply is
 'Then there will not be any objects to
 have any properties'.

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(p. 29)

Similar to your second objection, that
 2+2 physical objects must make 4
 physical objects does not apply.
 Of course I admit that he gives
 himself away by talking of 'things-in-
 themselves', thus admitting the idea
 of plurality to apply. But a discoverer
 must be ~~admitted~~ to be allowed some
 lapses - substituted 'Reality-in-itself'
 and your argument collapses. For if
 you say 'Reality-in-itself is one',
 he answers 'Reality-in-itself is many',
 or 'Reality-in-itself is five' he answers
 'None of these numerical ideas apply'.

Finishing all your remarks about
the beech tree full.

Finally you ^{might} say, 'At least Reality-in-itself
is something'. He replies 'Yes, but now

I am conceiving Reality-in-itself as a
phenomenal object, ~~the~~ name of the
counterpart of my phenomenal self' -

It seems to me that Chapter VIII is not within
a hundred miles of Kant's position.

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Chapter IX

You have entirely failed to convince me that there is such an universal as "whiteness". Your ~~own~~ ^{own} argument is that a lot of bother will be created in reconstructing the existing philosophical terminology and explanation. To a plain man this is very unconvincing - all philosophy is unpalatable to us.

I admit your proof as to 'relations' -

As to your proof that Universals are not merely mental [your pages are not numbered here], I wish you had taken a simpler instance than 'Edinburgh is north of London'. I am in such doubt as to the status of

Edinburgh 'ad North' ad London'
 in the physical world, ad of the
 status of the, physical world as left
 by you, that your argument doesn't
 carry much weight -

To repeat you define ~~the~~ 'physical objects'
 as 'real' - of p. 1 of my notes. Ad all
 your subsequent arguments seem to me
 to be that, if we now assume some
 physical objects [e.g. cats] to be
^[? = non-existent] unreal, the result is very paradoxical.
 Of course it is -

But of course, if you sweep away Kant's position
 ad Berkeley's, of course you are left with
 an ~~interrelated~~ physical world of

[which brings one back to ~~Hume~~ Berkeley - God, 'identical']

interrelated parts, or with one thing -

On the first alternative there are relations
not in the mind. What I am objecting
to is that one cannot see what you
are assuming in the 'London - Edinburgh'
illustration.